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ABSTRACT: Many argumentation theorists have adopted the view that argumentation may be approached 
from three different perspectives: the logical, the dialectical and the rhetorical—which I refer to as the 
Triumvirate.). According to Wenzel (1990), the conceptual foundation for this Triumvirate is the 
distinction between argumentation as product, as process and as procedure (the Tripartite Distinction.). In 
this paper, I want to raise questions about the Triumvirate View and the Tripartite Distinction on which it is 
based.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: argumentation theory, dialectical, distinction, logical, process, product, rhetorical 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Many argumentation theorists (Wenzel (1990), Tindale (1999), Blair (2003) to name but 
three) have either cited or adopted the view that argumentation may be approached from 
three different perspectives: the logical, the dialectical and the rhetorical. For reasons 
revealed later, I have dubbed these three perspectives ‘The Triumvirate.’ I take Wenzel’s 
1990 paper as the locus classicus for this view. There Wenzel puts down a conceptual 
foundation for this triumvirate—the distinction between argumentation as product, as 
process and as procedure (The Tripartite Distinction) and lays out the view he calls 
Perspectivism. This paper has made quite an impression having been cited by 22 
researchers [retrieved from Google Scholar, March 2009]. 
I endorse the spirit of pluralism that marks Wenzel’s position. However, there are 
aspects of it that give me pause, so I want to raise some concerns about both the 
Triumvirate View and the Tripartite Distinction. In the paper, I begin by sketching the 
history of the Triumvirate View. Then I recap the Triumvirate view and the Tripartite 
distinction. In the following section, I state my concerns. To conclude, I suggest a 
possible alternative to Wenzel’s way of understanding these matters. 
   
2. A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE TRIUMVIRATE VIEW 
   
In this section, I sketch just a bit of the history of the view I am considering. As all roads 
always seem to lead back to Aristotle, so we begin there. 
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Aristotle  
 
The seeds of the distinction can be found in Aristotle, at least if we follow Perelman’s 
reading in The Realm of Rhetoric (1982). Aristotle developed the first logic (his Prior 
and Posterior Analytics), though the term ‘logic’ does not appear until later.1 In addition, 
Aristotle deals with dialectical reasoning in the Topics and wrote extensively about 
Rhetoric as an inquiry. Note, however, that for Aristotle, rhetoric is a development out of 
dialectics:  
 
Aristotle says that rhetoric, i.e., the study of persuasive speech, is a ‘counterpart’ (antistrophos) of 
dialectic and that the rhetorical art is a kind of ‘outgrowth’ (paraphues ti) of dialectic and the 
study of character types. The correspondence with dialectical method is straightforward: rhetorical 
speeches, like dialectical arguments, seek to persuade others to accept certain conclusions on the 
basis of premises they already accept. Therefore, the same measures useful in dialectical contexts 
will, mutatis mutandis, be useful here: knowing what premises an audience of a given type is 
likely to believe, and knowing how to find premises from which the desired conclusion follows.2  
     
With Aristotle, then, we find the beginnings of a tradition in which rhetoric, logic and 
dialectic are conceived as inquiries each of which has something to contribute to the 
study of argumentation. But there is tension between, for example, rhetoric and 
philosophy (logic), and the relationship between rhetoric and dialectics is problematic. 
For much of this period, logic is treated as more or less the same as dialectic(s) (Leff 
2004). However, we must remember that logic, as we now think of it, does not undergo 
its greatest development until the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
    
Perelman  
 
One of the most forceful proponents of the rhetorical perspective is Perelman. In The 
Realm of Rhetoric, Perelman discusses logic, dialectic and rhetoric in the process of 
presenting his own views about argumentation. His way of understanding these 
approaches played a formative role in the development he calls The New Rhetoric, 
particularly his view of logic:  
 
It is certainly well known that in modern logic […] the mathematical logicians […] identify logic 
not with dialectic but with formal logic, with Aristotle’s analytic reasoning [he means here the 
Prior and Posterior Analytics], and completely neglects dialectical reasoning as foreign to logic. 
(p. 4) 
 
In Perelman’s view, there is an inquiry that he calls ‘dialectic.’ It studies dialectical 
reasoning and “begins from theses that are generally accepted with the purpose of gaining 
acceptance of other theses which could be or are controversial”(p. 2). According to 
Perelman, instances of dialectical reasoning are not made up of a series of valid and 
                                                 
1 Alexander of Aphrodisias is widely thought to have been the originator. (Thanks to John Woods for the 
reference.) 
2‘Aristotle,’ Robin Smith, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/ March 2009. 
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compelling inferences [that would be the subject of logic]. Dialectical reasoning advances 
arguments, which are more or less strong. 
 We are well aware that there has traditionally been tension between logic and 
rhetoric. Perelman seems to resolve this tension by more or less abandoning the logical 
perspective and bringing in dialectics to handle certain aspects of argumentation.  
 
Wenzel 
 
Beginning in the 70s, Wenzel authored a series of articles about various ‘perspectives’ on 
the study of argumentation (1990, pp. 11-12). In this paper, I focus on the 1990 version as 
the most mature version. According to Wenzel, argumentation consists of a set of 
complex activities that people engage in together for the sake of making decisions, 
solving problems and generally managing disagreements. His thesis we may take from 
pages 25-26:  
 
The final moral of this essay should now be clear: human judgment depends on argumentation, 
and argumentation depends equally upon the resources of rhetoric, dialectic and logic.  
 
This view–which he calls Perspectivism3–distinguishes and relates three perspectives4on 
argumentation: the rhetorical, the dialectical, and the logical. This view emerged from a 
lively debate about how to study argumentation, and it acknowledges “the legitimacy of 
multiple approaches” (p. 11). Each of these perspectives, says Wenzel, “is grounded in 
the tradition of Western humanism. Each […] takes certain of those activities within its 
scope and focuses on them in distinctive ways” (p. 11). Until the 70s there were, it seems, 
mainly the two perspectives of logic and rhetoric. But then Habermas, Zarefsky and 
Brockreide brought the dialectical perspective back into the equation.5 “To the 
conception of argument as a rhetorical process and logical product, Brockreide added the 
notion of argumentation as dialectical method” (p. 11).  
                                                
Here, then, we find the origin of what I am calling the Triumvirate View. I quote 
Wenzel:  
 
[…] [P]erspectivism has much to recommend it. First, it acknowledges the legitimacy of multiple 
approaches to arguments. Second, once we begin to see how different research traditions are 
grounded in different perspectives, we can appreciate how each kind of research produces unique 
results, how it differs from other approaches, but also how the perspectives relate to one another… 
(Wenzel 1990, p.11) 
 
 
3 Wenzel takes this term from Brockreide (1990, p. l1). 
4 Sometimes ‘approaches’ and ‘point of view.’ In discussion, Hansen asked: What is a perspective? The 
term ‘perspective’ is not defined here, nor is ‘approach.’ At first, this matter did not seem important, but I 
have come to see that Hansen’s question raises several important issues which, however, I cannot deal with 
in this paper. 
5 However, we know from earlier discussion that Perelman’s approach acknowledges the dialectical 
perspective. Nevertheless, it does seem that dialectic(s) disappeared at some point. It then reappears with 
great vigor with the emergence of the dialectical perspective. Leff says: ‘They (dialectics and rhetoric) are 
not fixed entities but evolving disciplines’ (2002, p. 53). 
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In the remainder of his 1990 paper, Wenzel fleshes out these three perspectives using a 
number of different categories: purposes, scope, focus, situation, resources, standards and 
roles. I cannot here follow the lucrative details of that discussion, which I recommend. 
 What I want to do now, with this bit of history behind us, is get a better grasp of 
the Tripartite Distinction and then move on to deepen our understanding of the three 
perspectives which together constitute what I call the Triumvirate.  
 
3. THE TRIPARTITE DISTINCTION 
 
Wenzel writes that  
 
working independently, but about the same time, [he] essayed a detailed analysis of the three 
perspectives, using similar key terms: the rhetorical process, dialectical procedure and logical 
product (Wenzel 1990, p.11).  
 
Wenzel suggests that the notions of process, procedure and product will prove helpful in 
sorting out these differences among the perspectives. I am not so sanguine. Let us see.  
The distinction between process and product seems to me fairly secure. It has a 
longstanding history here and in other disciplines. In logic, for instance the term 
‘inference’ is understood as ambiguous as between the process of drawing an inference 
and the inference that results from that process. That logic is focused on the product is, 
for the most part, correct. But two comments need to be made. First, formal deductive 
logic is not, in my judgment, a theory of argumentation so much as it is a theory of 
deduction. That is, formal logic studies the norms that apply to forms of the sort: If P, 
then Q; P; therefore Q. That arguments sometimes take such a form is not to be denied. 
That formal logic provides the norms, procedures, etc., that are necessary and sufficient 
to study all argumentation is highly contentious. Second, it should be noted that there are 
logical approaches that focus on process—viz., Dialogue Logics. (See Johnson 2000, pp. 
290ff.), so the logical perspective cannot be successfully characterized solely in terms of 
a focus on product. 
 The distinction Wenzel draws between process and procedure strikes me as much 
less secure. Nowhere does he indicate how he would differentiate between these two 
terms that would ordinarily be thought to be quite close in meaning. Wenzel writes:  
 
Of all the meanings of the term ‘dialectic,’ the one I employ here takes dialectic to be a method, a 
system or a procedure for regulating discussions among people’ (Wenzel 1990, p. 14).  
 
This passage suggests that Wenzel is not wed to the idea of procedure when it comes to 
unpacking the term ‘dialectical.’ Later, I will suggest a way of grounding these (and 
other) perspectives that does not invoke a distinction between process and procedure.  
 
4. THE TRIUMVIRATE  
    
The idea behind what I have called ‘The Triumvirate View’ is that three perspectives—
the logical, the dialectical, and the rhetorical—each have something equally important to 
contribute to the study of argumentation. As noted earlier, Wenzel does not clarify what 
he means by a perspective, but we can make inferences from what he has said that will 
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allow us to flesh out this concept. He says that each of these perspectives is grounded in 
the tradition of Western humanism (12). He refers the fact that ‘different research 
traditions are grounded in different perspectives’ (11). When he writes that 
“argumentation depends equally on the resources of logic, dialectics and rhetoric,” it is 
tempting to flesh this out by reference to the disciplines of logic, dialectics, and rhetoric, 
each of which have developed tools and resources for dealing with argumentation. The 
obvious problem with any such move is that though there is a dialectical perspective, 
there is—to my knowledge—no discipline called ‘dialectic(s)’ that studies 
argumentation—though there was at one time (see Leff 2002). We shall be returning to 
this point shortly. Let us continue to see how Wenzel unpacks each of these members. 
 
Logic  
 
Wenzel says: “Logic helps us to understand and evaluate arguments as products people 
create when they argue” (p. 9). One issue that arises now has to do with the standard to be 
used in evaluation. Wenzel’s position seems somewhat ambiguous to me. When he talks 
about logic, in some instances he seems to have in mind traditional formal logic and in 
other instances, informal logic. Thus on page 12 he says that “the logicians might say, ‘A 
good argument is one in which a clearly stated claim is supported by acceptable, relevant 
and sufficient evidence” (Wenzel 1990). These standards (criteria) are highly associated 
with informal logic. But on page 15, he writes that “logical theory as about the standard 
and criteria used to distinguish sound arguments from unsound ones” (Wenzel, 1990). 
The term ‘soundness’ is often associated with formal logic, the view that a good argument 
is a sound argument and a sound argument is one that has true premises and is valid. (It is 
not clear that this is the meaning that is being invoked here.) The differences between 
informal logic and formal logic have largely (but not only) to do with the appropriate 
standards for appraisal of argument. Historically, informal logic originated out of 
dissatisfaction with the approach taken by traditional (formal deductive) logic to the 
evaluation of argument which featured deductive validity. So on the issue of what 
standards are to be to be used in evaluating arguments, these two logics give different and 
perhaps incompatible accounts. What this means, and here is the relevant point for this 
discussion, is that one cannot easily speak of ‘the logical perspective.’ Rather it must be 
acknowledged there are a number of ‘perspectives’ within the logical perspective: the 
perspective of deductive logic, inductive logic, informal logic, etc. There are many other 
logics—modal logic, epistemic logic etc, but here we are concerned with those logics that 
have a direct bearing on argumentation. 
 
Rhetoric  
 
Wenzel writes that “as a first general statement, we may say that rhetoric helps us to 
understand and evaluate arguing as a natural process of persuasive communications” 
(1990, p. 9). An immediate problem that seems to confront us with unpacking the idea of 
the rhetorical perspective is: whose view of rhetoric is to be adopted in fleshing out this 
perspective? For there are many candidates. As our earlier discussion indicates, there is 
Aristotle (but whose Aristotle? [Poster, 2008]), Perelman (1969) (whose Perelan?), 
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Wenzel (1990), Tindale (1999) and many others whose perspectives may all be classified 
as rhetorical. 
In anything but the most general of senses, then, it seems to me that there is no 
such thing as ‘the rhetorical perspective.’ And I suspect that most who use the phrase do 
not intend it as a definite description [‘the so-and-so’] but rather as meaning something 
like ‘one example of a rhetorical approach.’ But that does not provide much comfort, 
since it would be difficult to offer an account of what counts as such a perspective that all 
those who consider themselves to be practitioners of this approach would agree with .For 
example, Perelman’s normative theory makes essential reference to the universal 
audience but Johnstone Jr. (1959) and Koch (2009) take quite different stances towards 
normative matters. We face something of the same situation we saw in connection with 
the logical approach: it seems that here too there exists a plurality of incompatible 
perspectives within the larger rhetorical perspective.  
  Another problem is that though rhetoric as a discipline remains vital, it appears 
that it has fallen on hard times as an academic unit.6 Departments of Rhetoric have closed 
and the study of rhetoric has been “shunted off” to the Department of English or perhaps 
to the Department of Communication (or Communication Studies). Here we need pause 
to take note of an important development—the emergence of a new perspective—
Communication—that has obvious relevance to the study of argumentation. It might be 
suggested that this new perspective can simply be included under the rhetorical, but that 
strikes me as dismissive of the integrity and autonomy of this important new area of 
research.  
This recent course of reflection has brought to the fore two important ideas. First, 
there are incompatible perspectives within the logical and the rhetorical perspectives. 
Second, new research communities and traditions have come to prominence or emerged 
since Wenzel wrote, and their perspectives need to be included if we mean to do justice to 
perspectivism. 
 
Dialectic(s)  
 
I have already noted that Wenzel takes dialectic to be a procedure (or method or system) 
for regulating discussions among people. He writes ‘dialectic helps us to understand an 
evaluation argumentation as a cooperative method for making critical decisions’ (1990, 
p.9). He notes that the simplest form of dialectic is that depicted in Plato’s dialogues. 
Aristotle wrote of the method as “the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides 
of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about several points that 
arise” (Topics, 101a. 35). Wenzel writes: 
 
Within in the dialectical perspective, the chief resources are designs or plans for conducting 
critical discussions. The term ‘discussion’ is used to include all kinds of communicative 
interaction ranging from simple conversation to formal debate. Any of these interactions is 
‘dialectical’ to the degree that it is motivated by the desire to examine a question critically by 
means of orderly procedures. (p. 21) 
 
                                                 
6 There is a fairly strong connection between academic units and disciplines, and also between disciplines 
and perspectives (and sub-perspectives). 
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However, as we shall shortly see, there is considerable variation in how to understand 
what constitutes a dialectical perspective. 
  To conclude the expository part of my paper, let me state that while I think there 
is both utility and validity to what I have called The Triumvirate View, concerns have 
been accumulating. Let me turn to those now. 
 
5. SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THE TRIUMVIRATE 
   
A triumvirate is rule by three parties. This way of speaking here runs the risk of creating a 
presumption that fails to acknowledge the legitimacy and importance of other 
perspectives. Wenzel is aware of this danger:  
 
You should not expect these perspectives to reveal everything you might want to understand about 
argumentation; there are many other approaches, some of which are represented in other chapters 
of this book. Nevertheless, rhetoric, dialectic and logic are central to the study of argumentation’ 
(1990, p.25).7  
 
The continued use of the triplet of adjectival forms—the logical, dialectical and 
rhetorical—may lead us to ignore what Wenzel here acknowledges—the fact that other 
perspectives besides these three have important insights and contributions to make to the 
study of argumentation. For as recently noted, there is an approach to the study of 
argumentation associated with Communication that is quite separate from rhetoric. And 
what about the contributions of linguistics? Here one could readily mention the work of 
theorists like Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) and also Zagar (1996).8 I do not think such 
initiatives as these can readily be placed within the purview of the Triumvirate. Even 
more important is to acknowledge the huge impact that our colleagues in Computer 
Science have had since a significant shift took place about 20 years ago when scholars 
changed their focus from knowledge to argumentation. Henry Prakken recently wrote: 
 
The first articles on argumentation in computer science appeared circa 20 years ago. Since then we 
have seen great advances, establishing a solid theoretical basis, a broad canvas of applications, 
and, most recently, some realistic implementations. The field has gone from infancy to maturity, 
and the initial questions that researchers posed—’how do we do this?’ ‘what is it good for?’ and 
‘how do we implement it’?’—are mostly answered. (Dix et al. 2008) 
 
Continued reference to the Triumvirate may contribute to our overlooking or 
marginalizing the contributions of other perspectives. I am not saying that the acceptance 
of The Triumvirate View causes exclusivist tendencies but it may well support them. 
  My second concern picks up on the point made above in connection with 
rhetoric—that in any but the most general and vaguest of senses, it seems to me that there 
is no such thing as ‘the rhetorical perspective.’ When it comes to ‘the logical perspective,’ 
possibly you might find something approaching unanimity as regards the formal logical 
approach. But that is just one of the ways in which ‘the logical perspective’ can be 
instantiated. If you went to a different way of implementing it—viz., informal logic—you 
                                                 
7 A similar note is sounded by the Editors of the volume, who say that ‘we need to explain our perspectives 
by acknowledging that other perspectives may be just as legitimate as the ones we have adopted’(1990,2), 
but they do not mention any. 
8 For a brief treatment of these, see van Eemeren et al (1996, pp. 350-53).  
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would find quite a few variations regarding just what is meant by informal logic and what 
that approach would look like. Even here at the University of Windsor—the home of 
informal logic—while Johnson and Blair agree on certain things about informal logic, 
they disagree on others (on the need for a dialectical tier, on whether informal logic can 
or should be characterized in terms of the search for a third type of link between premises 
and conclusion, to name but two). Hence it is important to note that those who do (or say 
they do informal logic) do quite different things under that label. Here again we see 
incompatible alternatives within a given perspective. 
When it comes to ‘the dialectical perspective,’ even greater problems appear, 
which is my next point. Finocchiaro says that ‘the dialectical approach has become the 
dominant one in argumentation theory’ (2003, p.13). A partial listing of authors who have 
made essential use of the term dialectic(s)/dialectical to characterize an approach to 
argumentation would include the following: Hamblin, 1970; Wenzel, 1980, 1990; Barth 
and Krabbe, 1982; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 1988, 1992; Blair and Johnson, 
1987; Finocchiaro, 1987, 2003; Blair, 1998, 2003; Johnson, 2000; Walton and Godden, 
2007. (For more detail, I refer the reader to the Appendix) 
 I am not sure that the dialectical approach has become the dominant one but it 
surely has enjoyed prominence. Why? Several factors might help explain the recent 
emphasis on the dialectical perspective. I would note the emergence of dialogue logics 
(the Erlanger School) in the 60s, Barth & Krabbe’s work on dialogue logic in the 70s and 
80s; Hamblin’s idea of Formal Dialectic; and in the 80s, the emergence of the pragma-
dialectical approach (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 1992). As I reviewed the 
references made by many different authors who have made use of the term ‘dialectical’ in 
connection with an approach to the study of argumentation, certain conclusions have 
suggested themselves.  
First, different theorists (of whom I am one) have used the term in different ways. 
Blair put the matter this way: 
 
Up to this point the word ‘dialectic’ has not figured in this paper. Its omission was deliberate. A 
glance at the literature on argument and argumentation will show that the terms dialogue, 
dialogical, dialectic, dialectics and dialectical are used either interchangeably or with so much 
variation that they mark no accepted distinction. (1998, p. 337) 
 
Second, a number of theorists have remarked on this very situation. Thus, Rescher 
says that “Dialectic is, as it were, the alchemy of philosophy. It is all things to all men” 
(1977, p. xi). Blair and Johnson say in a note that “[d]ialectical is a much used term, with 
many senses. Anyone using it owes his readers an explication of the particular meaning 
he assigns to it” (1987, 102, n.). [It is my impression that most theorists have followed 
this advice.] Tindale says: “There are a number of senses of ‘dialectical.” But as the 
references to Hamblin and Rescher indicate, we can observe as common features the 
exchange of views within a dialogue, governed by rules, aimed at resolving a dispute 
(1999: 43). I would say that while not all senses are captured by Tindale’s gloss,9 a great 
many are.  
                                                 
9 Leff’s (2002) characterization is not captured, nor is what Finocchiaro (2003) calls the dialectical-
monolectical contrast. 
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Third, I was struck not just by the variety of explanations of the term’s meaning 
(which may or may not converge on some core sense) but also by the variety of uses to 
which the term was put. It functions differently for Rescher in Dialectics (1977) than for 
Hamblin in Fallacies (1970). Rescher appropriated the term from the tradition of 
medieval disputation in order to remedy a defect in epistemology that can be traced to 
Descartes. Hamblin, on the other hand, appropriated his use of the term ‘dialectic’ from 
Aristotle to designate the study that is to complete the job that Formal Logic has begun. 
Hamblin says that ‘an analysis of fallacy must turn to formal dialectic’ (p. 254). So for 
Hamblin, formal dialectic functions to round out logic. [In his account of this, rhetoric 
plays no role. But see his discussion 69ff. of relations between rhetoric, dialectic and 
logic.] It is worthy of note that the term ‘dialectical’ had already made an appearance 
earlier in Fallacies, when Hamblin is discussing the task of finding an appropriate set of 
criteria for argument and had already rejected alethic and epistemic criteria. Here he 
developed the notion of dialectical criteria:  
 
We can hardly claim that an argument is not an argument because it proceeds ex consessu, or that 
such arguments have no rational criteria of worth. We are in fact talking about the class of 
argument that Aristotle called dialectical […](p. 242).  
 
We note here that there may well be a tension between two somewhat different meanings 
attached to ‘dialectical’ within this one perspective.  
Both of the above understand ‘dialectics’ differently from Barth and Krabbe in 
From Axiom to Dialogue (1982) who are working in the tradition of dialogue logic that 
may be traced back to the Erlangen school. Dialogue logics approach argumentation as a 
process—a dialogue, an exchange between a proponent and an opponent, where the task 
of logic is to set forth the norms for the conduct of the dialogue—the assignment of rights 
and duties in the setting of the dialogue.10 These views in turn had an influence on van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst who say that they have profited from the insights in the Barth 
Krabbe work cited above (1984, p. 199, n.60) and have imbedded the term in the name of 
their project—The Pragma-dialectical Approach—which has been perhaps the most 
prominent development in the modern history of this complex term. But here we must 
take note of an important difference in their respective understandings of ‘dialectic.’ The 
norms of pragma-dialectics are not logical norms and are not put forth as such. Pragma-
dialectics falls outside the scope of dialogue logic as it was conceived by Barth and 
Krabbe.  
 Readers may have long since noted another complicating factor that hovers over 
this discussion; viz., the prominence (indeed sometimes the co-occurrence of) the term 
‘dialogical.’ Finocchiaro says:  
 
In regard to approaches that might be labeled rhetorical and dialectical, I would begin by 
delimiting the meaning of these terms as follows. I would take rhetorical in Perelman’s sense, as 
meaning pertaining to persuasion. And I take dialectical to mean dialogical, that is pertaining to 
dialogue.’ (Finocchiaro 1987,p.82)  
 
                                                 
10 For a fuller treatment of dialogue logic, see Barth (2002). 
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This text is one possible source of the conflation of two terms which, it seems to me, 
ought not to be run together. Fortunately, I have a colleague who has made this point very 
nicely. Blair writes: 
  
It will never happen but it would be nice if the term ‘dialectical’ were reserved for the properties 
of all arguments related to their involving doubts or disagreements with at least two sides, and the 
term ‘dialogical’ were reserved for those belonging exclusively to turn taking verbal exchanges. 
Then we could then use this terminology to express the points that (1) all argumentation is 
dialectical but by no mean is all argumentation dialogical, and (2) the dialectical properties of 
dialogues, and the norms derived from the dialogue model, do not apply to non-dialogical 
argument exchanges, even though the latter are dialectical too. (1998, 338) 
 
 Reviewing the variety of meanings, uses and functions that have been labeled 
‘dialectical,’ I come to the conclusion that, of the three terms in wide use to designate 
perspectives on the study of argumentation), ‘dialectical’ appears to be the most 
problematic. It seems to have the widest range and the most complicated story. In my 
view, this adjective—dialectical—has four distinct settings. In the first, ‘dialectical’ taken 
as related to the inquiry known as dialectic(s). The dialectical perspective would be that 
taken by those who study dialectic(s). We have seen that while there was once was such a 
discipline, no such discipline currently exists. In a second setting, ‘dialectical’ refers to 
one perspective on the study of argumentation which, with the logical and the rhetorical 
perspectives, forms the Triumvirate. In the third, ‘dialectical’ contrasts with dialogical 
approaches, the apparent conflation of which we have just discussed. In the fourth 
‘dialectical’ marks an alternative to monolectical approaches (Finocchiaro 2003, p. 19).  
One final problem is that there are various ways of understanding relationships 
among the three members of the Triumvirate. In the ideal order, members of a triumvirate 
share the task of governing. And Wenzel sees the situation as one of parity: each of the 
three perspectives has an equal role to play in the study of argumentation. None stands 
out as more important than the others. However, I could find there no argument in 
Wenzel’s paper that these three perspectives are of equal importance. And it is not 
altogether clear what parity looks like when it is fleshed out in detail. Does it mean that 
any viable theory of argumentation must have a rhetorical component, a logical 
component and a dialectical one? Or is the claim to be understood globally: that overall 
the study of argumentation requires input from all three perspectives? When it comes to 
individual theories, theorists see matters quite differently. In Pragma-dialectics, the 
dialectical perspective is basic; the rhetorical is brought in through what is called the 
strategic maneuvering, logic is barely mentioned at all (though its wares are prominent in 
the rules). In Tindale’s Acts of Arguing (1999), the rhetorical perspective is taken as 
basic. In my Manifest Rationality (2000), the logical perspective is assigned the role of 
being basic. 
But the situation—how the various perspectives are related—is even more 
complex than indicated here. For a careful analysis of the various possible types of 
relationships among these perspectives, I cannot do better than recommend Blair’s 2003 
paper. Even if we restrict ourselves to the Triumvirate, we have seen that there are 
fundamental disagreements about the roles assigned to each. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
I chose the term ‘triumvirate’ as a frame to draw attention to what I take to be the way 
that many (unconsciously) think about these matters. They take these terms to designate 
the dominant approaches to the study of argumentation, and believe that each has an 
important contribution to make. By and large, I agree with this view but believe there are 
problems with it, which I have hoped to bring to the fore by imposing the term 
‘triumvirate.’  
The first problem I mentioned was the danger of being insular, of excluding or 
minimizing the important contributions made by other perspectives. I mentioned 
linguistics, communication and computer studies but could also have mentioned 
psychology and epistemology, both of which of which have contributions to make to the 
study of argumentation. 
The second problem emerged from reflecting on phrases like ‘the rhetorical 
perspective,’ or ‘a dialectical perspective,’ I am led to make the following observation: 
we would be better off speaking about rhetorical perspectives, dialectical perspectives, 
and logical perspectives to acknowledge that there are a variety of ways in which 
theorists could work within these larger perspectives.  
The third problem had to do with the wide-ranging views about the so-called 
dialectical perspective. It is one thing for the pragma-dialectician, another thing for the 
dialogue logician, and something yet different for some informal logicians. Here I 
suggested we can minimize one sort of misunderstanding by adopting Blair’s distinction 
between dialectical and dialogical. 
The fourth concern has to do with the distribution of power within the 
Triumvirate. In the locus classicus, Wenzel took the parity view that the three 
perspectives are equally valid, equally fruitful. But it seems to me that we want to ask the 
question: Are the three equally fruitful? Even if there are multiple perspectives, it does 
not follow that all will be equally fruitful in helping us to understand argumentation 
better. 
To conclude, the three perspectives on the study of argumentation which I have 
dubbed the Triumvirate emerged over time in various disciplines, or communities of 
inquiry11 all of which have their traditions and libraries (books, journals, encyclopedias) 
in which are housed their intellectual wares (basic concepts, issues, problems, techniques, 
theories etc). They are identifiable as being connected with the inquiry known as rhetoric, 
an inquiry known as logic, and an approach called dialectic(s) whose status is somewhat 
more problematic. Rather than attempt to locate their respective spheres of influence by 
means of the process-product-procedure distinction, I have been suggesting an 
alternative. Members of these communities—the rhetorical community, for example—are 
bound together, not by a focus on process as distinguished from procedure, not by the 
acceptance of any one view of what rhetoric is, nor by any commonly accepted definition 
of rhetoric (any more than is the case with philosophy), nor even by a common 
understanding of what the rhetorical perspective looks like, nor yet by an agreement 
about what the crucial issues are. They are bound together by a common history, 
tradition, education, and an ongoing interest in a wide range of issues and problems.  
                                                 
11 For an insightful discussion of the various ways of interpreting this idea, see McKerrow (1990). 
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That these three communities have the longest experience with argumentation 
seems clear, but that should not blind us to the considerable variations within them, and 
more important it must not lead us to marginalize or undervalue the insights available 
from other traditions and inquiries—that is, from other perspectives. 
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